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Introduction
Notwithstanding the fact that Jilrgen Habermas's theory of discourse (or communicative) ethics has, over the years, provoked extensive and wide-ranging critique, the Habermasian approach to moral theory has largely remained intact. On one hand, a considerable body of research has been produced by those who stand in general support of the program--critics, that is to say, whose goal has been to raise and address narrowly specified problems within the theory and, thereby, to correct some of its more troublesome aspects with a view to strengthening the project as a whole.1 On the other hand, of course, there are those who 688 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS ethics attempts to treat the reality of moral pluralism in a posttraditional world, and it does so precisely through a shift from monologic to dialogic modes of normative legitimation. Now, once the actuality of moral pluralism is acknowledged, and once it is agreed that normative claims may be contingent upon one's social, historical, or cultural context, it becomes apparent that the possibility of universal moral validity depends directly on the difference between contingent and universal norms. In other words, if he is to de-transcendentalize Kantian moral theory by discarding the doctrine of the two realms without, at the same time, sacrificing the possibility of moral universalism, Habermas must draw a sharp distinction-here and now in everyday practice, so to speak; he must be able to distinguish between norms that are amenable to rational argumentation and therefore may be said to be universally justified-norms that constitute the so-called moral sphere-and norms that follow from particular notions of the good life and, as such, resist rational, consensual resolution (i.e., so-called ethical norms).
My argument bears directly on this crucial demarcation. For, as Seyla Benhabib recently remarked, the division between justice and the good life is "truly an important point, and one to which sufficient attention has not been paid in the literature."5 In contrast to Benhabib, however, the question that interests me most is not how discourse ethics might be reformulated without this sharp distinction in place, but rather why this divide is necessary and what, given its necessity, are its consequences. Specifically, what I want to underline is that Habermas's theory actually requires a morality-ethics split, and that this requirement gives rise, in turn, to two mutually contradictory necessities.
The problem can be spelled out as follows. First, Habermas must maintain the rationality of the moral sphere against incursions from the contingencies of ethical life. For it is only in this way that discourse ethics may claim to have justified a universalist perspective and, thereby, to have avoided falling prey to such biases as metaphysics or ethnocentrism. In other words, in light of the reality of moral pluralism in the postmetaphysical (posttraditional) world, the theory of discourse ethics must be conceived in purely procedural and formal terms, lest it be argued that, in being permeated by contingent, ethical goods, the moral sphere as explicated by Habermas reflects and imposes only the particular form of life which Habermas, among others, prefers.6 In the second place, however, discourse ethics must still qualify as essentially normative, not merely analytic, in nature. For if Habermas insists that only a formalist ethic can meet the demand of rationality and thereby overcome the charge of cultural contingency, he is nonetheless aware that such an undertaking cannot lose its emphatic character altogether-that a purely procedural ethics risks being a trivial one, whereby it could be said that there is nothing substantively moral about it at all. To this extent, Habermas is also impelled to demonstrate the emphatic nature of moral universalism. Taken together, however, these necessities leave Habermas in the predicament of having to explicate the moral point of view in such a way as to render it both ethically empty and yet normatively full. Discourse ethics therefore will require compromises beyond what either of its aspects can bear. 6 . Seyla Benhabib takes issue with this claim, arguing that there can be universal, as well as culturally-specific goods; she offers the example of the good of human rights. Yet Benhabib herself is very clear that, when conceived as a good rather than exclusively in terms of what is just, the ethos of human rights is in part culturally constituted and, as such, is not strictly rational; it is, therefore, ethically contestable relative to other goods. Indeed, based on the argument that a universalist morality of human rights and liberal tolerance follows from the perspective of the third person legislator, and that this perspective, in turn, entails culturally specific, albeit thin, notions of the good, Benhabib accuses Rainer Forst of coming closer in some respects "to an ethnocentric communitarian position" than she herself does, insofar as Forst would limit himself to that standpoint alone. Since it is this very charge of ethnocentricism that the autonomy of the moral sphere is intended to refute, however, such a softening of the line between morality and ethical life as Benhabib proposes will not serve Habermas's theoretical purposes. Given the constitutive difficulty of this project, it should come as no surprise that Habermas's version of discourse ethics fails on both fronts. In what follows, therefore, I treat each aspect-the formal elucidation of communicative ethics and the argument for its normative bearing-in turn (sections 2 and 3). I show that in order to reconcile its contradictory ends, Habermas's theory must tacitly implicate both a transcendental notion of reason and a teleological conception of psychological maturation. As I shall argue, Habermas cannot discard this set of assumptions except at the cost of falling prey (in the first instance) to the charge of relativism and (in the second instance) to the charge of triviality. These analyses thus illustrate how, when and where the discourse ethics program shores up the metaphysics it putatively transcends.
On the Autonomy of the Moral Sphere
With regard to the first dimension of the Habermasian project, the attempt to address the pluralism of the modern world in postmetaphysical terms, we must begin by recalling that for Habermas, as for Weber, modernity is characterized by the fragmentation of reason into its different applications in the spheres of science, morality and art. from my intention than to make myself an advocate of such a regression, to conjure up the substantial unity of reason."10 It is on this basis that Habermas insists upon a narrow, purely procedural role for moral reason; given a plurality of worldviews, the theory of communicative ethics is intended to explicate only the process of normative legitimation, and is to be held entirely separate from evaluative questions of the good. "Moral theory is competent to clarify the moral point of view and justify its universality," he says, "but it can contribute nothing to answering the question 'Why be Moral?'"' Indeed, even more pointedly, Habermas says:
What moral theory can do and should be trusted to do is to clarify the universal core of our moral intuitions and thereby to refute value scepticism. What it cannot do is make any kind of substantive contribution. By singling out a procedure of decision making, it seeks to make room for those involved, who must find answers on their own to the moral-practical issues that come at them, or are imposed on them, with objective historical force.12 Yet notwithstanding its evaluative neutrality, the formal delineation of communicative reason is intended to serve a crucial moral role. Specifically, it would not be unfair to characterize the driving motivation of the discourse-ethical project as a whole in terms of Habermas's desire to establish an incontrovertible moment of normative unconditionality for the theorization of social life. For Habermas, this moment is the sine qua non of a justified critique of society. Without the unconditional, he says, 
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"we must be prepared to renounce the emancipatory potential of moral universalism and deny so much as the possibility of subjecting the structural violence inherent in social conditions characterized by latent exploitation and repression to an unstinting moral critique."13 Significantly, this insistence on the unconditional means that the distinction between "morality" and "ethical life" is absolutely crucial for Habermas's argument. In other words, if it is only by virtue of "the moral point of view" that one can arrive at agreements which are universal-that is to say, unconditional and therefore "rational"-in nature, then what Habermas calls "moralpractical discourses" do indeed "require a break with all of the unquestioned truths of an established, concrete ethical life"; they require, in fact, the "distancing [of] oneself from the contexts of life with which one's identity is inextricably woven."14 Most importantly, to fail to determine a sphere comprised of universalizable norms would be to, "[succumb] to a relativism that robs moral commands of their meaning and moral obligations of their peculiar force."'5 Against Seyla Benhabib, then, we must concede that the morality-ethics divide is structurally indispensable; it concerns nothing less than the very basis, in Habermas's eyes, for a legitimate critical political response to social and political forms of injustice. The first issue at stake, therefore, is the strength of Habermas's case for the autonomy of the moral sphere.
With regard to this question, the thesis I wish to defend is that Habermas fails to distinguish clearly between the moral and the ethical spheres-that is to say, between "justice" and "the good"-except at the cost of burying a metaphysical premise in the theory of communicative ethics. In other words, I shall argue that dis- side effects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual."18 Many theorists, of course, have drawn attention to the crucial shift Habermas proposes: from monologic to dialogic processes of justification. I shall return to this shortly. For the moment, however, I want to underline a particular aspect of this move. It is that, as Albrecht Wellmer has carefully argued, in order to qualify as valid, a norm must not only be considered through a process in which all interests are fairly and fully (reciprocally and symmetrically) represented-that is, a process in which all the reasons of all concerned are weighed equally and impartially so as to determine which reasons are the most forceful. Additionally, the norm must also be one to which all have actually agreed-that is, the interests of all concerned must also, in fact, have been served.19
This requirement becomes apparent once we notice, with Wellmer, that the justificatory process itself can only be redeemed (i.e., determined as a valid one) retroactively. In other words, Wellmer argues, when taken as a principle of justice, Habermas's (U) is "quasi-circular": we can only say that all interests have been impartially represented in the first instance (i.e., that all reasons and interests have been brought forward and equally weighted in the argument) in light of a consensus (i.e., the determination of a norm which actually serves all interests) in the second instance.20 Thus Habermas's explication of a common will escapes the charge that it is a metaphysical postulation precisely because it is a factual achievement; unless an actual agreement results from the discussion, there is no "common will" to speak of at all.21 It cannot be argued, therefore, that (U) provides only a formal presupposition of, or regulative idea for, argument-that, insofar as "communicative reason, unlike practical reason, is not itself a source of norms of right action,"22 (U) is merely a rule of argument the goal of which is consensus. While this claim is fair as far as it goes, it obscures the fact that we cannot establish that a norm is legitimate unless we can establish that the principle of (U) has been applied, and-most crucially-(U) cannot be said to have been applied unless an actual consensual agreement among impartial discussants has been reached.23 Significantly, therefore, while the conditions of the procedure itself are a necessary feature of its rationality (I return to this shortly), they are insufficient in themselves as the criterion of normative validity. Equally important is an actual consensus-the achievement of an agreement among us as to what our common (universal) interest really is-since only a consensus qualifies the strictly valid norm, and only the identification of such a norm, in turn, can retroactively establish the moral sphere. Indeed, it is precisely in this sense that Habermas speaks of the "discursive redemption" of validity claims.24 Once this is acknowledged, another significant difference between Kantian and Habermasian morality can be brought to light. In discourse 
Most importantly, this means that rationality can no longer be said to follow from the mere achievement of universality (i.e., consensus)-as it did follow in the Kantian paradigm from the mere fact of being able to will without contradiction-since a universal agreement might be reached on any one of a variety of bases (agreement might be based purely on fear of reprisals, for example). The mere fact that we have agreed is not in and of itself evidence of rationality. Thus what Habermas calls the "rational potential inherent in everyday practice"26 resides not in the criterion of universalizability alone but, additionally, in the discursive process whereby a universal agreement is achieved.27 As Wellmer notes, the "structural characteristics of an ideal speech situation" become for Habermas the defining feature of rationality.28 More specifically, an agreement is deemed fully rational only when it is based solely on the force of the better argument; namely, when the conditions for the agreement are (or at least adequately approximate) the ideal conditions of mutual recognition and reciprocity.29
Now this demand for an impartially-determined norm through actual consensus is precisely where Habermas runs into trouble. For it is precisely here that the definitive distinction between the categorically moral and the contingently evaluative must be established; here that an unconditional moral "ought" must be shown to be identifiable under real and not merely ideal discursive conditions, and here that the theory of discursive ethics must be identified as a moral theory in its own right rather than as a specific application of a consensus theory of truth applied to the realm of justice. Yet it is at this crucial moment that Habermas's 26. Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 341. 27. Universal here is to be taken to mean, "among all concerned with or affected by the norm in question"; that is, the rightful participants in the moral discourse.
28. See Wellmer, "Ethics and Dialogue," pp. 164-65 and 245, n.52. 29. Habermas qualifies the "redemption" of a validity claim in terms of "the framework of a discourse which is sufficiently close to the conditions of an ideal speech situation for the consensus aimed at by participants to be brought about solely through the force of the better argument, and in this sense to be 'rationally motivated"'. Cited in Wellmer, "Ethics and Dialogue," p. 166. I leave aside the obvious objection that the "better" argument in moral disputes is rarely transparently evident. theory of discourse ethics relies tacitly upon the possibility of transparent, ahistorical and culturally unencumbered rationality.
It is somewhat ironic that this conclusion can be demonstrated with reference to Seyla Benhabib's work, given her obvious sympathy with the Habermasian approach in general. But Benhabib has argued that the justice-ethical split that characterizes the onset of modernity translates into a split between the public and the domestic or private, with the consequence that the latter is simply left behind as part and parcel of an atemporal state of nature that is prior to history.30 This means that the public, male figure of moral and political, justice-oriented theory is himself split "into the public person and the private individual"-a dualism Benhabib characterizes in terms of what she calls the "generalized" and the "concrete" other.31 Most significantly, she suggests there is an "epistemic incoherence in universalistic moral theories" such as those of Lawrence Kohlberg and John Rawls, which entrench this dualism by focusing exclusively on the standpoint of the "generalized other."32 She argues:
We must ask whether the identity of any human self can be defined with If the idea of a "self" prior to its concretization is incoherent as Benhabib suggests, and if, therefore, "there is no human plurality behind the veil of ignorance but only definitional identity, then this has consequences for criteria of reversibility and universalizability said to be constituents of the moral point of view. Definitional identity leads to incomplete reversibility."34 Benhabib's argument thus suggests that the very distinction between justice and the good life which characterizes modern Western societies institutes a "generalized" concept of the self which renders universalistic moral theories constitutively incapable of accounting for concrete differences among actual moral discussants. This contention is directly relevant to the matter at hand, since Habermas, like Rawls, calls for "complete reversibility" in the specific sense that, "in communicative action speaker and hearer assume that their perspectives are interchangeable."35 Indeed, we have seen that discourse ethical claim to rationality stands or falls with the impartiality of the process whereby consensual agreement is achieved. To this end, Habermas contends, at the level of argumentative praxis, "perspectives, relations of recognition, and normative expectations built into communicative action become completely reversible in all relevant respects, for participants in argumentation are credited with the ability to distance themselves temporarily from the normative spectrum of all existing forms of life."36 There is a curious equivocation at work here, however, for unlike Rawls Habermas also insists that the role of such idealizations-for example, "crediting interlocutors with the ability to distance themselves from values of a evaluative, substantive kind"-does not entail the problem of empty formalism. On the contrary, he claims, "First, (U) regulates only argumentation among a plurality of participants; second, it suggests the perspective of real-life argumentation, in which all affected are admitted as participants. In this respect my universalization This equivocation signals a crucial problem. If Habermas can be said to escape Benhabib's critique of Rawls by virtue of the fact that in his theory individual self-understandings and identities are not to be suspended but are, on the contrary, to be given "full play in discourse," then the procedure of moral discourse cannot be said to establish rationality by virtue of its impartiality. For in this case the strict criterion of impartiality will not have been met. On the other hand, if the individual participants in a moral discourse are fully to distance themselves from the contingent, "normative spectrum of all existing forms of life," the result for discourse ethics will be a transcendentalizing of the subject and the consequent "epistemic incoherence." Benhabib finds in moral theories that focus exclusively upon that standpoint. Either way, therefore, rationality cannot be said to be established solely by virtue of the discourse ethical procedure.
In response to Benhabib's analysis, Rainer Forst has recently argued that Rawls's description of an original position is intended only to establish the legitimacy of the principles of equality and reciprocity in discourse; "any further 'concrete' moral, political or legal questions," he says, "have to be dealt with in different ways," and "these ways obviously include others as concrete persons." To this extent, Forst argues, Kantian theories (such as 
Rawls's) do not entail the sharp opposition between the "general" and the "concrete" that Benhabib describes. 39 Such a critique, however--even if plausible--cannot be mobilized here. For there is a significant difference between Habermas's theory of justice and that of John Rawls, and to this extent Forst too quickly dismisses Benhabib's analysis as it bears on Habermas's work. Whereas as Rawls merely posits primary goods and an original position in order to arrive at principles of justice, Habermas seeks to derive those same principles from the structural features of communicative action as it might actually take place (i.e., in "real life argumentation"). Importantly, this means that fully embodied, concretely-situated persons are necessary not only for the resolution of "further questions," but for the legitimation of the principles themselves. For this reason, it will not do for Habermasians to appeal to "an unavoidable 'ideal' moment in the sphere of morality," whereby the, "criteria of moral validity necessarily transcend[s] moral agreements ... that have been reached."40 For it is that very ideal, qua normative criterion, that Habermas is trying to establish in actual (pragmatic) rather than in transcendental terms. 41 Habermas in fact foregoes Rawls's strong version of generalizing the other for precisely this reason; he insists that the legitimacy of norms follows from having given specific viewpoints and interests full play in a moral discourse.42 In this case, therefore, it would appear that the discourse ethicist cannot do without the kind of concretization that Benhabib is calling for, since only concrete selves can engage in the full reversal of interpretive structures that Habermas demands. Consequently, however, he must give up the discourse ethical claim to impartiality as well. For concretely-situated others, in contrast to general or abstract ones, are decidedly partial, precisely to the extent that they cannot be said to be removed from the normative spectrum of their everyday lives. The implication of Benhabib's argument for Habermasian discourse ethics is thus that the impartiality of the moral point of view is bought at the cost of transcendentalizing the subject. On the other hand, insofar as Habermas intends a genuine and not merely a nominal pluralization of moral interlocutors, his distinction between morality and ethical lifethe very distinction upon which the rationality of discourse ethics depends-is untenable. Indeed, Benhabib notices that it was the very shift to a justice or moral orientation within modern political thought that gave rise to the general-concrete difference in the first place.
Notwithstanding this difficulty, Habermas is quite right to take issue with Benhabib's own solution. Her proposal is to replace a strictly moral theory with a "communicative ethic of need interpretation," whereby "the object domain of moral theory is so enlarged that not only rights but needs, not only justice but possible modes of the good life, are moved into an anticipatory-utopian perspective."43 Yet once it is agreed that evaluative or ethical goods are necessarily implicated in justificatory processes of moral legitimation, the discourse ethics project is undone altogether. As Charles Taylor Clearly, Habermas must reject Benhabib's version of discourse ethics; his refutation of the charge of relativism rests directly on the contention that the universal core of our normative intuitions can be distinguished absolutely from the contingencies of ethical life on the basis of the application of the principle of universalizability (U). Now in Habermas's reconstruction of (U), it will be recalled, the rationality of moral action shifts from its basis in the Kantian injunction to universalize without contradiction to that of a procedure aimed at a universal consensus guided by impartial reasoning and ideal role-taking. Yet we have also seen that the impartial reasoning and ideal role-taking Habermas has in mind are the characteristics of a generalized other that is definitionally incapable of undertaking the full reversibility upon which Habermas himself insists. Indeed, the principle (U) may be said to have been applied only when concretely situated individuals (each of whom necessarily brings his or her substantive, ethical concerns and perspectives into the discussion) have actually participated in a debate. Consequently, no purely rational, non-relative, unconditioned sphere of morality can be said to emerge from the procedure itself.
Without recourse to an unthematized transcendentalism, then, (U) cannot be relied upon to mark retroactively the distinction between questions of justice and questions of the good life and, thereby, to confer moral validity (in the form of unconditionality) on the process of normative legitimation. Such unconditionality would require a prior distinction between morality and ethical life; without a distinction between justice and the good already in place, there is no basis for the postulation of a generalized (transcendental) other capable of the pure impartiality moral legitimacy requires. Without the prior availability of this distinction, in other words, we must face the reality of concrete discussants who are not impartial, transcendental subjects, but 44 . Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 88. are situated, partial individuals whose moral arguments are inextricably layered with contingent evaluations. Consequently, the theory of discourse ethics must either fall prey to the charge of relativism, or it must continue to rely on an abstract notion of the human subject-it must rely on a subject, that is, whose transcendence of the historical, gender, racial, class, and cultural (inter alia) contingencies of everyday life is not merely a temporary achievement but a constitutive attribute.
Habermas's attempts to address Benhabib and Gilligan's critiques of the Kohlbergian self do not resolve this difficulty with specific regard to moral justification. On the contrary, he shifts the terms of the debate, arguing: to say, one may, on one hand, accept the contradiction inherent in the first aspect of Habermas's project by acknowledging that communicative ethics achieves its status of unconditionality by virtue of implicating an unthematized transcendentalism. Lacking a transcendental subject, the proceduralism in question may be seen to be culturally and historically loaded; it is not, however, liable to the charge of triviality since, on this view, substantive, ethical beliefs are always already implicated in moral discourses.
On the other hand, if one can establish the autonomy of the moral sphere by resolving the problem characterized here as Habermas's pluralization of transcendental man, the possible triviality of Habermas's program becomes a real risk. For if (U) could truly be said to act "like a knife that makes razor sharp cuts between evaluative statements and strictly normative ones"47--if the explication of (U) had actually established a definitive separation between the moral sphere and ethical life-then Habermas would confront an additional and perhaps impossible task. In the face of a definitive divide, he would have to substantiate his own crucial contention "that the procedural explanation discourse ethics gives of the moral point of view-in other words, of the impartiality of moral judgments-constitutes an adequate account of moral intuitions which are after all substantive in kind."48
In order to counter the charge of triviality, then, Habermas must demonstrate a necessary connection between a procedurally-derived universalism, and the substantive nature of moral belief; he must somehow reunite-without compromising its ethical neutrality-the sphere of moral validity with that of evaluative goods. Yet the theory of discourse ethics, I shall argue, does not adequately support the possibility of an unconditional feature of ethical life. Rather, the unconditional normativity of the Habermasian "ought" is on my view conditioned by an unthematized teleology.
Given my contention, it is important to note that, on the face of it, Habermas is very clear that a truly postmetaphysical, deontological theory can provide no answer to the question "Why be Moral?": "Once the bond between the right and the good is Yet this is not to say that Habermas views discourse ethics as no more than a normatively empty procedural mechanism. On the contrary, he speaks regularly of "the substantive normative presuppositions of argumentation"52 which the theory is intended to elucidate. In fact, we have seen, what is at stake here is nothing less than, "the possibility of subjecting the structural violence inherent in social conditions ... to an unstinting moral critique."53 Now if the procedural rationality characteristic of modernity is intended not only, as Habermas says, "to give credence to our views in the area of moral-practical insight",54 but indeed, to serve as the very basis of a justified critique of society, then Habermasian moral theory must do more than specify "to each discussant an equal and reciprocal share." Additionally, the theory of discourse ethics must explicate the precise sense in which such procedural necessities as (U) might command are substantively normative in nature.
This demand cannot be met merely with reference to the rational dimension of (U) as it has been elucidated so far. As Wellmer insightfully argues, even if (U) could be said to ensure the rationality of the moral domain by giving rise to genuinely universal claims, this feature of discourse ethics alone would not suffice to explicate a specifically normative "ought. Yet even in Habermas, Wellmer argues, the distinction should be maintained. The generalization (or equality) principle is, strictly speaking, merely a logical principle of legitimation; it tells us to be consistent in our behavior by treating like cases equally, and, on this basis, allows us to determine whether a norm meets the conditions for legitimacy. However, insofar as the elementary concept of justice (equality) that this rule entails is-at least on Wellmer and Habermas's view-the only normative concept which could itself be legitimized on these terms (i.e., consensually agreed to by everyone concerned), the sense of morally right action and the conditions for its realization seem to coincide: both are determined as "universalizability" in Habermas's moral theory, and in this sense, a more substantive sense of "morally right action" is accordingly lost.
In fact, once morality has been reformulated as Habermas proposes, it is no longer obvious that (U) conveys substantive normative content. For if no argument is made specifically 
concerning its normative dimension, (U) could be fairly said to represent a general principle of distributive justice (i.e., justice as participatory equality), but not a strictly moral principle. Given Habermas's divergence from Kant, then, he is faced with the added burden of providing a nonmetaphysical explanation of the relation between rationality and normativity. Unless he can do so, discourse ethics will amount to no more than an amoral explication of the purely logical imperative not to contradict ourselves. In this sense, the necessity at stake is that of being able to show not only that agreements reached among discussants are rational -as might be said of a consensual agreement on any questionbut that they are also necessarily moral, which is to say normative, in nature.
It is to this end that Habermas insists on the emphatic dimension of communicative ethics. Indeed, he directly addresses charges of empty formalism and abstract universalism by arguing that participants in practical discourse are inevitably exhorted to partake in ideal role taking-that is, to accept the normative content inherent in the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation-and that participants are "constrained to speak and act under idealized conditions."57 Since the exhortation and constraint we experience as communicative agents is directly consequent upon our intersubjectively (hence collectively) constituted identities, Habermas argues, discourse ethics entails an ineradicable concern for the common weal. As he says, "though organized around a concept of procedure, [discourse ethics] can be expected to say something relevant about substance as well and, more important perhaps, about the hidden link between justice and the common good."58 And it is in making this case, I contend, that a teleological assumption is unavoidably implicated in the communicative ethics project.
To see this we must note that, for Habermas, (U) is derived from procedural rules of argumentation-that is, from a reflective form of communicative action-and communicative action in turn entails both a strategic and an understanding orientation. Thus Habermas attempts to demonstrate that a bridging principle which makes consensus possible-the formal principle (U)-can There is no form of sociocultural life that is not at least implicitly geared to maintaining communicative action by means of argument, be that actual form of argument ever so rudimentary and the institutionalization of discursive consensus building ever so inchoate. Once argumentation is conceived as a special form of rule-governed interaction, it reveals itself to be a reflective form of action oriented toward reaching an understanding. Argumentation derives the pragmatic presuppositions we found at the procedural level from the presuppositions of communicative action. The reciprocities undergirding the mutual recognition of competent subjects are already built into action oriented toward reaching an understanding, the action in which argumentation is rooted.60
Most importantly, "that is why the radical sceptic's refusal to argue is an empty gesture": on the basis of the quasi-transcendental demonstration that this refusal entails a performative contradiction, Habermas contends that the sceptic "remains bound" to the presuppositions already implicit in the "communicative practice of everyday life."61 As I have already suggested, our being bound to the communicatively derived presuppositions of argumentation is crucial to the task of explaining the normative dimension (as opposed to the rationality) of a specifically "moral" domain. By rooting a virtually inescapable rule of argumentation in action oriented toward reaching an understanding, therefore, Habermas seeks to ground the normative ideals of reciprocity and symmetry (i.e., the impartial point of view) as the sense-the obligatory force-of the moral "ought."
We can now understand, I think, Wellmer's observation that, "what is expressed in the unconditional character of the moral 'ought' is the fact that our possible identity as creatures capable of speech is tied to ... a structure of intersubjectivity."62 For as 59 
Habermas explains, morality can be understood in "anthropological terms" as a "safety device compensating for a vulnerability built into the sociocultural form of life." He maintains as a "basic fact" that we are constituted as subjects at all only insofar as we 'externalize' ourselves by engaging in intersubjective communication, and that this engagement results in "an almost constitutional insecurity and chronic fragility of personal identity."63 Similarly, he says, "morality is aimed at the chronic susceptibility of personal integrity implicit in the structure of linguistically mediated interactions, which is more deep-seated than the tangible vulnerability of bodily integrity, though connected with it."64 To the extent that our very possibility as subjects depends upon our communicative interaction, then-and indeed Habermas insists that the alternatives to such interaction are schizophrenia and suicide in the long term65-the impartiality that characterizes the moral point of view as elucidated within discourse ethics is a quasi-natural, inescapable, affectively compelling aim of both individual and social development. This is why, I want to propose, Habermas relies-as indeed he must continue to rely-on the developmental psychology of Lawrence Kohlberg.66 For against the charge of relativism, Kohlberg's theory of moral development offers the possibility of (a) reducing the empirical diversity of existing moral views to variation in the contents, in contrast to universal forms, of moral judgment and (b) explaining the remaining structural differences between moralities as differences in the stage of development of the capacity for moral judgment. 
